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THE DILEMMA OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT IN EGYPT
QUESTIONS OF GENDER EQUALITY, ELIMINATION OF POLITICAL
OPPOSITION AND UNDERPRIVILEGED CITIZENS
Shams Al Din Al Hajjaji
I. INTRODUCTION
The judicial appointment process involves several legal, political, and social aspects. 1 Inconsistency between these aspects can lead to discrimination and inequality, eating away at the
core of the judicial system. 2 Both the legal and political aspects of judicial appointment have
a great impact on society. 3 This is manifested in discrimination against political opponents,
underprivileged citizens, and women. In terms of gender inequality in judicial appointments
in Egypt, presently only 68 out of 15,000 judges are female, 4 indicating a clear lack of female representation in all three supreme courts (the Court of Cassation, the State Council,
and the Supreme Constitutional Court). 5 Equally, underprivileged and political minorities
rarely have an equal chance in the appointment process. 6 This paper argues that a balance
must be sought between judicial qualifications and judicial appointment powers in order to
eliminate any discrimination in the appointment process. 7 In summary, the ideal situation in
judicial appointment involves striking a balance between appointment qualifications and relevant appointment powers in order to remove any form of discrimination in the appointment
process.
The judicial appointment process covers two aspects: judicial legitimacy and judicial qualification. 8 Judicial legitimacy refers to the source of the judicial authority. In the republic system, although the judge rules in the name of the people, 9 defining the actual role of the people can be challenging. 10 It may take on a direct form of legitimacy, in that the judge is directly elected, or it can take on an indirect form, in which the judge is appointed by an elected authority: either the president 11 or both the president and Parliament (Congress). 12 In
1

See generally Peter Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is there one “Best” Method? 23 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1995), http://ir.law.fsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1455&context=lr.
2
Theresa Beiner, The Con Law Professor with Judicial Appointment Power, 14 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 6
(2013); see
Daniel Nadler, An Opportune Moment: The Judicial Appointment Reforms and the Judicial Credentials Demanded by
the Charter, 15 CONST F. 131 (2006).
3
See generally David Williams, The Judicial Appointment Process, 2004 N.Z.L. REV. 49 (2004).
4
Dalia G., Egypt swears in 26 new female judges, EGYPT STREET, (July 17, 2005),
https://egyptianstreets.com/2015/06/ 17/egypt-swears-in-26-new-female-judges/.
5
See generally Mahmoud Hamed, Egypt: The Lingering Battle for Female Judgeship, 23 in GENDER AND THE
JUDICIARY IN AFRICA FROM OBSCURITY TO PARITY? (Gretchen Bauer & Josephine Dawuni ed., 2016).
6
See generally Lobna Monieb, Egyptian law graduates denounce class based job discrimination, AHRAM
ONLINE, (Oct. 20, 2014), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/0/113461/Egypt/0/Egyptian-lawgraduates-denounce-classbased-jobdis.aspx; see Sarah Moawad, Egypt’s Poor Revolution, MUFTAH, (Oct. 24,
2014), https://muftah.org/egypts-poor-revolution/#.WdIr0GhSzIU.
7
See generally Dominc O’Sullivan, Gender and Judicial Appointment, 19 U. QUEENSLAND L. J. 107 (1996);
See also Rosalind Dixon, Female Justices, Feminism, and the Politics of Judicial Appointment: A ReExamination, 21 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 297 (2009).
8
Id.
9
Law No. 89 of 1986 (Regarding the organization of Certain Cases of Public Invitations for General
Subscription), 1 ARAB L. Q. 579, 1986, (Egypt).
10
See generally Thomas Cooley, The Fundamentals of American Liberty, 3 MICH L. J. 149, 149-151 (1894).
11
Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 71 (Egypt).
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Egypt, Article 20 of the 1973 Judicial Authority Law (JAL) states that “judgments are issued
in the name of the people.” 13 The definition of the people, however, was left out. There were
no clear definitions of the people during successive republican eras. The socialist/communist
system of former President Gamel Nasser defined the people as only one category of people
––those who were members of the Socialist Union. 14 Under former presidents Anwar Sadat
and Hosni Mubarak, the concept of the people became even more vague than during Nasser’s
era. 15 Instead of fixing the concept of the people to reflect a democratic form of government,
they maintained their authority over the judicial appointment process. 16 The Egyptian Constitution of 2014 grants the judiciary full independence in the appointment process. 17 The judiciary is the competent authority for appointing judges. Even though such an act ensures, in
the judges’ view, independence of the appointment process, such process lacks any form of
checks and balances between the judiciary, executive, and legislative branches. As a result,
the definition of the people –– who are the purported source of judicial legitimacy –– remains
unclear. It also raises the question as to who the judiciary is accountable to if they are considered their own source of legitimacy.
Judicial qualification starts once a candidate enters law school. 18 Any law student is a potential candidate for a judicial career. Holding a law degree is, in most world jurisdictions, the
first requirement towards a judicial appointment. A judge in a district court is a potential
judge for one of the courts of appeal, and, similarly, a judge in one of courts of appeal is a
potential candidate for the Supreme Court. 19 The judicial appointment process reaches its
peak when the candidate holds a position in the Supreme Court. 20Judicial qualification covers three aspects: general judicial requirements, judicial education requirements, and judicial training requirements. General judicial requirements concern the nationality of the
judge. 21 Education requirements can vary across states, with some preferring more than a law
degree. 22 There are only three countries that require nothing but a law degree to become a
judge: the United States, the United Kingdom, and Egypt. 23 Many states, such as Germany,

12

John Tunney, Judicial Appointment process, 34 PEPP L. REV. 275, 275-277 (2006-2007), see also, David
Law, Appointing Federal Judges: The President, the Senate and the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 26 CARDOZO L. REV.
479, 482 (2005).
13
Former laws, which were also during the republic period, the article used the word “nation” instead of the
“people”. The using of the word nation reflected the regime understanding to the Arab Nation. Is also reflected
the union between Egypt, Syria and Yemen during that time. See Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law),
al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 20 (Egypt).
14
See generally Peter Mansfield, Nasser and Nasserism, 28 INT’L J. 675 (1973).
15
AMR SHALAKANY, IZDIHĀR WA-INHIYĀR AL-NUKHBA AL-QĀNŪNIYYA AL-MIṢRIYYA 1805-2005, 277 (Dar
Al-Shorouk, 2013).
16
Id.
17
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 100, 14 Jan. 2014, (stating that “Court decisions shall
be issued and implemented in the name of the people.”).
18
See generally Juan Mayoral, Urszula Jaremba, & Tobias Nowak, Creating EU law judges: the role of generational differences, legal education and judicial career paths in national judges’ assessment regarding EU law
knowledge, 21 J.
EUROPEAN PUB. POL. 1123 (2014).
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
The nationality requirement is not exclusive requirement in Egypt. It is a general requirement in most of the
universal
jurisdictions like the United States. See U.S. COURTS, Citizenship Requirements for Employment in the Judiciary, http://www.uscourts.gov/careers/search-judiciary-jobs/citizenship-requirements-employment-judiciary.
22
See generally Lorne Sossin, Judicial Appointment Democratic Aspirations, and the Culture of Accountability, 58 U.N.B.L.J. 25 (2008).
23
Id.
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require a master’s degree in law as a prerequisite for judicial appointment. 24 Judicial training
requirements come in two forms. The first is that of pre-appointment training, while the second concerns continuing education and training. Pre-appointment training is a common requirement in France, Germany, and Egypt; 25 other states, including the United States, do not
require such training.
The comparison between various jurisdictions serves several purposes. 26 First, it highlights
two conflicting aspects of judicial appointment: prioritizing either judicial appointment qualifications or judicial appointment powers. 27 Second, the comparison aims to form the legal
basis for the proposed solution, which is outlined in the last section of this paper. 28 This paper addresses a pressing challenge in Egyptian society dealing with discrimination against
women, political minorities, and underprivileged people. 29
The comparison is limited to the practices of four countries and the applicability of these
practices to the Egyptian case. These countries are the United States, the United Kingdom,
France, and Germany. Practices of these four jurisdictions fall under three general approaches. The first approach places more importance on the competent authority over judicial appointment qualifications (the US Example). 30 The second approach places less weight on the
competent authority, while attaching more importance to judicial appointment qualifications
(French Example). 31 The last approach balances judicial appointment requirements and judicial appointment powers (German Example). 32
The founders of modern Egypt adopted the French legal system in the early 1880s. 33 The
German legal system is the next closest to the French and Egyptian systems. 34 Egypt adopted
the French legal system while it was still a British colony. 35 However, the British system indirectly influences the practices of the Egyptian legal system. 36 The US legal system is based

24

See generally Barbara Hamilton, Criteria for Judicial Appointment and Merit, 15 QUEENSLAND U. TECH. L.
J. 12 (1999).
25
See Luis Muniz-Arguelles & Migdalia Fraticelli-Torres, Selection and Training of Judges in Spain, France,
West Germany and England, 8 B. C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 9-15 (1985).
26
See generally David Clark, Comparative Law Methods in the United States, 16 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
135 (2011); see Thera Dieleman & Lotte Meurkens, Jaakko Husa: A New Introduction to Comparative Law, 22
MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 640 (2015); see also Edward J. Eberie, Method and Role of Comparative
Law, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 475 (2009).
27
See generally Terence Lau, Judicial Independence: A Call for Reform, 9 NEV. L. J. 79 (2008); see W.H. Huriburt, Appointment of Judges, 6 ALTA. L. REV. 175 (1968); see also, Timothy Youdan, Powers of Appointment,
27 EST. TR. & PENSIONS J. 268 (2008).
28
See generally Max Rheinstein, Teaching Comparative law, 5 U. CHI. L. REV. 623 (1938); see Pierre Legrand,
Negative Comparative Law, 10 J. COMP. L. 435 (2015).
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
See generally Geoffrey Samuel, Comparative law and Jurisprudence, 47 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 825 (1998).
32
Id.
33
Bryon D. Cannon, A Reassessment of Judicial Reform in Egypt, 1876-1891, 5 INT’L J. AFR. HISTORICAL
STUD. 51, 55
(1972).
34
See Luis Munis-Arguelles & Migdalia Fraticelli-Torres, Selection and Training of Judges in Spain, France,
West Germany and England, 8 B.C. INT’L COMP. L. REV. 1, 37 (1985).
35
See generally Mary Daly, What Every Lawyer Needs to Know About the Civil Law System, PROF. LAW SYMP.
ISSUES 38 (1998).
36
See generally Fernando Orrantia, Conceptual Differences between the Civil Law System and the Common
Law System, 19 SW. U. L.REV. 1161(1990).
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on the principles of separation of power and checks and balances. 37 Thus, in addition to
French and English influences, there is the influence of the US legal system with regard to
the method of appointment. 38 Despite these influences, the Egyptian legal system still lacks
some of these principles. The purpose of this paper is to present the variations and differences within various legal jurisdictions.
This paper is divided into four main sections. The first section presents the judicial formulation of the Egyptian judiciary, which includes judicial administration and judicial organization. The second is a case study on Egyptian judicial appointment methods. It includes two
key aspects related to judicial qualification requirements and judicial appointment powers.
This part illustrates the difference between de facto and de jure in the judicial appointment
system in Egypt. These differences pave the road to a deeper understanding of legal and political aspects of discrimination within the appointment process. The third section discusses
contemporary challenges in judicial appointment. These challenges can be summarized as
gender inequality, elimination of political minorities, and underprivileged citizens. The
fourth section proposes a solution for problems identified in this paper.
II. JUDICIAL FORMULATION OF THE EGYPTIAN JUDICIARY
A. Judicial administration:
A) The first body is the Supreme Constitutional Court (hereinafter SCC). 39 It is the competent judicial body with ultimate power over constitutional disputes. However, litigants cannot
resort directly to the SCC. They must first get the approval of the regular or administrative
courts to resort to the SCC.
The establishment of the SCC underwent two phases during Sadat’s era. The first was the
legal articulation of the basis of the SCC, while the second involved the establishment of the
Court. The actual process of establishing the SCC, however, started after the first Egyptian
constitution was ratified in 1923.
The first time the Egyptian courts recognized the unconstitutionality claim was in 1926. 40
The courts did not declare the unconstitutionality of the law; rather they maintained their
right not to apply the law. Banning Egyptian courts from handling the constitutionality of the
laws is based on many reasons. First, even though the Egyptian civil legal system is based on
the French system, the application of the laws turned into a monocracy. This was a system
that excluded the King’s acts, which include the constitutionality of the law, from the judicial
37

See generally Peter Quint, Implications of the President’s Appointment Power, 73 MD. L. REV. 87 (2013); see
William Smith, Reflections on Judicial Merit Selection, the Rhode Island Experience, and Some Modest Proposals for Reform and
Improvement, 15 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 668 (2010); see also Geoffrey NcNutt, Formal and Functional
Approaches to Separation of Powers: The Political Cost of Checks and Balances in Nixon v. United States and
Morrison
v. Olson, 2 GEO. MASON L. REV. 301(1995).
38
See generally Rachel Brand, Judicial Appointment: Checks and Balances in Practice, 33 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 55 (2010); see Cheryl Saunders, Separation of Powers and the Judicial Branch, 11 JUD. REV.
337 (2006); see also Harold Laski, Technique of Judicial Appointment, 31 Com. L. League J. 447 (1926).
39
See generally Tamir Moustafa, Law Versus the State: the Judicialization of Politics in Egypt, 28 L. &
SOC. INQUIRY 886 (2003).
40
Ahmed Abdel Fattah, Mostafa Mohi & Moetaz Nadi, Al-Mahkamah Al-Dostoryah Al-a’lya: Tarikh
men-al-Qada
we-al-Syasyah,
Al-Masry
Al-Youm
(July
30,
2013),
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/151535.
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authority. Second, there was a lack of a legal foundation –– which would have been more
realistic –– for such authority from 1883 to 1971. There was no legal foundation to grant
courts the right to deal with the constitutionality of law. 41
The first time the unconstitutionality of the laws was legalized was in 1953. This took place
right after the 1952 coup. 42 This legal endeavor had initially failed because members of the
army refused any judicial supervision. 43 The second legal attempt took place after the 1971
Constitution. This constitution included five new articles, numbered 174 to 178 that regulate
the formulation of a specialized constitutional court. First, the 1971 Constitution stated that
the SCC is an independent judicial body. 44 Second, it addressed the tackling of constitutional
questions.
There is also the time gap between the first articulation of the SCC and the SCC Law. It took
eight years (from 1971 to 1979) to establish the court. One of the reasons for this was the fear
of an independent judiciary that would deal with the constitutionality of the law. 45 Furthermore, there was a need, after the shift to a market-based economy in Egypt, for the SCC to
oversee the legality of the laws. There was a need to ensure the rule of law in the country to
attract foreign investment. 46
The SCC is an independent judicial body. 47 The 2014 Constitution ensures the independence
of its seat, budget, and general assembly. The SCC consists of three main bodies. The first is
the chief justice of the Court, who is the head of the Court. The chief justice has many other
constitutional responsibilities, including the impeachment of justices. 48 In the case of both
the absence of a president, and/or the disseverment of parliament, the chief justice takes
charge of the country until a new president has been nominated. 49 The current chief justice of
the SCC, Adly Mansour, replaced President Mohamed Morsi as interim president after the
military coup of July 2013. 50 He ruled Egypt for nine months, until Field Marshall Abdel Fatah al-Sisi won the presidential elections in March 2014. 51
The second body is the People’s Assembly, which is responsible for the administrative affairs
of the court. The People’s Assembly is “responsible for governing the Court’s affairs and is
consulted during law drafting of issues related to the Court’s affairs.” 52 The People’s Assembly also has additional functions. Article 144 of the Constitution states “[i]n case of the ab41

Id.
Id.
43
Id.
44
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 174, 14 Jan. 2014 (stating that “The Supreme
Constitutional Court shall be an independent judicial body with a distinct legal nature in the Arab Republic of Egypt, and shall have its seat in Cairo.”).
45
See generally Tamir Moustafa, Law versus the State: The Judicialization of Politics in Egypt, 28 L. &
SOC. INQUIRY 883, 886 (2003).
46
Id. at 889.
47
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 191, 14 Jan. 2014 (stating that “[t]he SCC is an independent judicial body… [I]t has independent budget, the items of which are discussed by the House of Representatives, after it is approved, it is incorporated in the state budget as a single figure.”).
48
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 159, 14 Jan. 2014 (stating that in case of impeachment of the president, a special tribunal is formulated to prosecute Chief Justice of the SCC).
49
Id. at art. 160.
50
BBC NEWS, Profile: Interim Egyptian President Adly Mansour (July 4, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23176293.
51
BBC NEWS, Egypt Abdel Fattah al-Sisi Profile, (May 16, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middleeast-19256730.
52
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 191, 14. Jan. 2014.
42
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sence of the House of Representatives, the oath is to be taken before the General Assembly
of the SCC.”53 It is also the body that oversees the acceptance of the resignation of the president in the event of the People’s Assembly being dissolved. 54
The third body is the Commissioner Authority, which consists of the judges, advisors, and
assistant advisors. 55 Members of the Commission are ranked as chancellors. 56 Their role is to
prepare the cases for the SCC judges. They have the right to contact any governmental or
nongovernmental entities within the country to request information pertaining to certain cases. 57 The Commissioner Authority plays the role of the investigator in the case in order to
produce a report or opinion to the SCC about the case in question. 58 The report presents constitutional and legal issues and offers its legal opinion. 59
The SCC has jurisdiction over certain types of cases. The Constitution lays down the general
line of the jurisdiction of the SCC, while the SCC law lays down the details. 60 In short, the
SCC is responsible for overseeing the following issues: the judicial supervision of the constitutionality of the law and regulations (Art. 25), 61 the conflict of law and the conflict of jurisdiction among judicial institutions (Art. 25), 62 the conflict raised as a result of contradictory
judgments between two different judicial institutions (Art. 25), 63 the interpretation of the
laws and regulations (Art. 26), 64 and the unification of the interpretation of the laws (Art.
26). 65 Figure (1) presents the entities of the SCC and their main functions:
Figure (1): SCC formulation and administration
Supreme Constitutional Court
Chief
Justice of
the Court

Committee of Temporary
Issues

Takes on the Public Assembly
Tasks during the Annual Vacation
of the Court (Art. 10)

53

Responsible for
initiating the
preliminary
investigation against
the court members in
the impeachment
process (Art. 19)

Public Assembly
Tasks
Case
assignment
(Art. 8)

Opinions
about
amendment
of the Court
regulations
(Art. 8)

Member
s

Vice
President
s of the
Court

President
of the
Court
Commissi
on

Id. at art. 144.
Id. at art. 158.
55
Id. at art. 193.
56
Law No. 48 of 1979 (Supreme Constitutional Court), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 1979, art. 21 (Egypt).
57
Id. art. 39.
58
Id. art. 40.
59
Id.
60
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 192, 14 Jan. 2014 (stating that the court is: exclusively competent to decide on the constitutionality of laws and regulations, interpret legislative texts, and adjudicate
in disputes pertaining to the affairs of its members, in disputes between judicial bodies and entities that have
judicial mandate, in disputes pertaining to the implementation of two final contradictory rulings, one of which is
issued by any judicial body or an agency with judicial mandate and the other issued by another body, and in
disputes pertaining to the implementation of its rulings and decisions).
61
Law No. 48 of 1979 (Supreme Constitutional Court), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 1979, art. 25 (Egypt).
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. art. 26.
65
Id.
54
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Supreme Constitutional Court
Chief
Justice of
the Court

Committee of Temporary
Issues

Takes on the Public Assembly
Tasks during the Annual Vacation
of the Court (Art. 10)

Public Assembly

Responsible for
initiating the
preliminary
investigation against
the court members in
the impeachment
process (Art. 19)

Tasks
Case
assignment
(Art. 8)

Opinions
about
amendment
of the Court
regulations
(Art. 8)

Member
s

Vice
President
s of the
Court

B) The second body is the ordinary judiciary, which is the main judicial body. It is the competent judiciary for all types of cases except two. First, administrative cases fall under the
State Council jurisdiction. 66Article 15 of the Judicial Authority Law (hereinafter JAL) states
that
“except administrative disputes, which the State Council is in charge of,
courts are competent of every type of disputes and crimes.” 67 Second, constitutional disputes
fall under the jurisdiction of the SCC.68 Moreover, the ordinary judiciary consists of the Public Prosecution Office (hereinafter PPO) and three different types of courts: the Court of Cassation, the Court of Appeal, and the Court of First Instance (primary courts and partial
courts). 69 Figure (2) shows the hierarchy of the ordinary judiciary.

President
of the
Court
Commissi
on

Figure (2): Hierarchy of the ordinary judiciary
Court of
Cassation
(1 Court)

Court of
Appeal
(7 courts)

Court of First
Instance

• Primary Court
(27 courts)
• Partial Court (in
every district in
the country)

66

Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 15 (Egypt).
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 188, 14 Jan. 2014 (states that the judiciary adjudicates all disputes and crimes except for matters over which another judicial body is competent. Only the judiciary settles any disputes relating to the affairs of its members, and its affairs are managed by a higher council
whose structure and mandate are organized by law).
68
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 192, 14 Jan. 2014.
69
Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 15 (Egypt).
67
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The Court of Cassation is the highest court and the only one of its kind in the ordinary judiciary, as shown in Figure (2). It was established in 1931 and is located in Cairo. 70 It consists of
four bodies. The first is the Court of Cassation Public Assembly, which consists of all the
members of the court, including those of the chief justice, associate justices, and junior justices. The work of the Court of Cassation is based on the principle of seniority. The most
senior member takes charge of the court. The presidency term of the court is just one judicial
year, which starts in October and concludes at the end of September the following year. The
chief justice also serves as president of the Supreme Judicial Council (hereinafter SJC). The
second entity is made up of the Criminal Law General Committee and the Civil Law General
Committee. 71 Each committee consists of 11 judges chosen by members of the People’s
Assembly. 72 The third body is the court circuits. There are a total of 33 circuits, of which 16
deal with criminal cases and 17 with civil, commercial, family and labor cases. 73 The fourth
entity is the Court of Cassation Technical Office. This office specializes in the administrative
affairs of the court. 74 Figure (3) illustrates the formulation of the Court of Cassation.
Figure (3): Formulation of the Court of Cassation

Court of Cassation
Court of
Cassation
Prosecution
Office
(Article 24)

Technical Office
(Article 5)

Public Assembly of the Court (Judges of
the Courts)
(Article 4)

Civil, Commercial, Family
Committee

Criminal Committee
Misdemeanor
Circuits

Felony
Circuits

Civil Circuits

Commerical
Circuits

Family
Circuits

Labor
Circuits

The Court of Cassation is not a court of facts but rather a court of law. This means that parties cannot bring new additions to their cases. The Court of Cassation only rules on whether
the lower court of appeal has applied a correct understanding of the law. 75 Additionally, the
Court of Cassation is responsible for determining general legal rules that are followed in any
given dispute. It offers a unified understanding of the law, which all lower courts must follow. The process of developing these rules is restricted. It goes through three main stages.
First, one of the 33 circuits has to establish a new rule or overrule an existing one. This circuit must then transfer its new rule to the competent general committee to determine the applicability of the new rule. Seven members of the competent committee must agree on the
new rule to be able to proceed to the next step. Second, if the new or overruled ruling is accepted by seven members of the competent committee, the new rule is then transferred to the
two general committees together for approval. A majority of 14 out of 22 judges must agree
to consider a new legal rule. 76 Third, a procedural rule must be followed by the technical of70

CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 2, 14 Jan. 2014.
Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 3 (Egypt).
72
Id. at art. 4.
73
Id.
74
Id.at art. 5 (stating that it specializes in “supervision of the case row of the court, present similar and
connected cases, or these cases that need single legal principle to execute a judgment.”).
75
EGYPT JUSTICE, Court of Cassation: The Supreme Court of Egypt’s Common Court System,
https://egyptjusti ce.com/court-of-cassation/.
76
Id.
71
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fice of the court. This office is responsible for publishing the new rule to the general public.
This process is summarized in Figure (4) 77
Figure (4): Establishing a legal rule by the Court of Cassation

Court of Cassation Public
Assembly
Two General Committees
( Criminal and Civil
Committees)

Circuits

(33 circuits)

(14 criminal and 17 civil )

77

Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 5 (Egypt).
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Egypt is also home to eight courts of appeal. 78 These are located in Cairo, Alexandria, Tanta,
Mansoura, Ismalia, Bani Swaif, Assiut and Qena governorates. 79 Before the courts in Qena
and Ismalia were introduced in 2006, there were only six courts. The circuits in the Court of
Appeal consist of three judges. 80 All of them have the rank of “Judge at the Court of Appeal.”
The Court of Appeal has jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases. For civil law jurisdiction,
it is restricted to appeal cases that are worth more than forty thousand (40,000) Egyptian
pounds. These types of cases are under the jurisdiction of the primary court (in the court of
first instance jurisdiction). 81 As for the criminal law jurisdiction, the Court of Appeal is responsible for felony cases only. To this day, felony cases have no specialized appeal court.
The current form of appeal for felonies is to resort to the Court of Cassation, which is a process that takes place over various stages. In the first stage, the Court of Cassation, because it
is a court of law, does not deal with the facts of the case. If it finds an incorrect legal interpretation, it orders a retrial at a different circuit of felony courts. In the second stage, the defendant has the right to appeal the second felony court’s judgment in front of the Court of Cassation. In the second appeal, the Court of Cassation either sustains the second felony court
judgment or rules in the case by itself. In the latter case, the Court of Cassation acts as a court
of equity. It will hear all witnesses, excluding new evidence, and all factual pleadings. As a
result of this complicated process, many lawyers and politicians request a legal amendment
to include an appeal level for felony courts. The 2014 Constitution includes an article that
mandates an appellate court for felony judgments. 82 To date, however, there is no regulation
governing the appeal of felonies.
As shown in Figure (2), the Court of First Instance is divided into two different courts, namely the primary courts and the partial courts. First, the primary court is the upper court within
the Court of First Instance. There is one primary court in each governorate. 83 It consists of
several circuits. Each is made up of three judges. 84 In civil law cases, the primary court has
unique value jurisdiction. It is considered a court of first instance for cases worth more than
forty thousand (40,000) Egyptian pounds. However, it is considered a court of appeal for
cases worth less than forty thousand (40,000) pounds. 86 In criminal law matters, the primary
court is considered an appeal court for misdemeanor cases. Second, the partial court is the
lower court within the Court of First Instance, with one in every district in the governorate. 87
The partial court consists of one judge. It has jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters. For
civil law jurisdiction, it has non-appealable jurisdiction over civil cases that are worth less
than forty thousand (40,000) pounds. In cases worth less than forty thousand (40,000) pounds
and more than five thousand (5,000) pounds, the partial court acts as a court of first instance. 88 As for criminal law jurisdiction, it is restricted to misdemeanor cases only, which
are crimes that are punishable by a sentence of less than three years). 89
78

Id.at art. 10.
Id. at art. 6.
80
Id.
81
Id. at art. 4.
82
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 96, 14 Jan. 2014 (stating “the law shall regulate the
appeal of felony sentences”).
83
Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 9 (Egypt).
84
Id.at art. 7.
86
Act No. 81 of 1996 (To Amend Provisions of the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure, Law No. 13 of
1968), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, vol. 19 bis, 22 May 1996, art. 42 (Egypt).
87
Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 13 (Egypt).
88
Act No. 81 of 1996 (To Amend Provisions of the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure, Law No. 13 of
1968), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, vol. 19 bis, 22 May 1996, art. 42 (Egypt).
89
Law No. 58 of 1937 (Criminal Code), 5 Aug. 1937, art. 11 (Egypt).
79
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The PPO is considered an integral part of the regular judiciary. Contrary to widespread understanding, the role of the prosecution is considered part of the executive authority. 90 The
Egyptian PPO, during the Republic Era, underwent three stages of developments that eventually led to giving prosecution a judicial characteristic, which is the status of the prosecution.
In the first stage, the PPO was a member of the executive authority (1951-1952). 91 Judges
were responsible for investigations, while the public prosecutors’ work was limited to the
prosecution of cases. In the second stage, the PPO enjoyed a mixed role, both executive and
judicial, as a result of the Criminal Procedures Law amendment in 1952. This amendment
gave the PPO the power and privileges of an investigative judge. Article 199 of the Criminal
Procedures Law gave prosecutors the right to investigate any case. Even though the prosecution enjoyed the privileges of an investigative judge, the nature of the prosecution –– whether
it was executive or judicial –– was still unclear. The Court of Cassation dealt with this question in 1961. It emphasized the mixed nature of the public prosecution. The judicial nature of
the prosecution consisted in it performing the role of an investigative judge, while its executive nature involved all the other tasks of the prosecution. 92 In the third stage, the prosecution
was considered a purely judicial authority. After a long debate over the nature of the prosecution, Article 189 of the 2014 Constitution considered the PPO members an integral part of the
judiciary. 93
Part of the judicial nature of the PPO is the judicial nature of the position of the attorney general, which is not yet reflected in the present JAL. Before 2014, the president had the ultimate authority to appoint the attorney general. 94 However, the 2014 Constitution transferred
this authority over to the SJC.95 After the assassination of Attorney General Hesham Barakat
in 2015,96 the appointment of a new attorney general was put on hold for more than six
months. 97 The reason for the delay was that the president wanted to appoint the new attorney
general, while the SJC upheld its constitutional right to do so itself.98 Following this struggle,
the SJC successfully appointed the new Nabil Sadek. As for the judicial oath, it must still be
taken before the president. 99

90

Stephanie Dangel, Is Prosecution a Core Executive Function? Morrison v. Olson and the Framers’ Intent, 99
YALE L. J. 1069, 1070 (1990); see also Saikrishna Prakash, Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 589
(2005).
91
Law No. 150 of 1950 (Criminal Procedures Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 15 Oct. 1951 (before
amendment art. 63, 64 and 199) (Egypt).
92
Mahkamat al-Naqd [Court of Cassation], case no. 1551, session of 9 Jan. 1961, year 30.
93
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 189, 14 Jan. 2014 (stating that the public prosecution
is an integral part of the judiciary. It is responsible for investigating, law exempts pressing charges and prosecuting all criminal cases except what. The law establishes the public prosecution’s other competencies).
94
Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, arts. 44 and 119
(Egypt).
95
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 189, 11 Jan. 2014 (stating that “public prosecution is
carried out by a Prosecutor General who is selected by the Supreme Judicial Council from among the Deputies
to the President of the Court of Cassation, the Presidents of the Court of Appeals or the Assistant Prosecutor
Generals, by virtue of a presidential decree for a period of four years, or for the period remaining until retirement age, whichever comes first, and only once during a judge’s career”).
96
BBC NEWS, Egypt Prosecutor Hisham Barakat Killed in Cairo attack, (June 29, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/w orld-middle-east-33308518.
97
Mariam Jabal, Khlaf Dostori Yoajal Iktiar al-Na’b al-Am (“Constitutional Dispute Delaying the Selection of
Attorney General”), ALBAWABA NEWS, Sept. 11, 2015, http://www.albawabhnews.com/1493128.
98
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 189, 14 Jan. 2014.
99
Nabil Sadek Sworn in by Sisi as Egypt’s New prosecutor general, AHRAM ONLINE, (Sept. 19, 2015),
http://english.ah
ram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/0/141872/Egypt/0/Nabil-Sadek-sworn-in-by-Sisi-as-Egyptsnewprosecu.aspx.
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C) The third body is the administrative court, which is represented in the State Council. From
1949 to 1984, administrative courts were part of the executive authority. Article 1 of the
State Council Law stated that the State Council was an institute affiliated with the Ministry
of Justice.100 After the 1952 military coup, the army issued a new law that made the State
Council an independent body under cabinet supervision. 101 In 1972, the new State Council
law transferred the supervision from the cabinet back to the Ministry of Justice. In August
1984, the law was amended to give the State Council full independence from the executive
authority. The current formulation of Article 1 of the State Council law states: “The State
Council is an independent judicial authority.” 102 The 2014 Constitution and the State Council
law thus give the administrative courts exclusive jurisdiction over administrative disputes. 103
The State Council consists of three different branches, as shown in Figure (5). These branches are the judicial, legislative, and advisory bodies. The judicial branch has exclusive authority over administrative disputes. It consists of the Supreme Administrative Court, the Administrative Courts the Disciplinary Courts, and the State Commission Board. 104 Additionally,
the State Council Law excludes some administrative disputes, such as acts of sovereignty,
from its jurisdiction 105
The legislative branch is the competent authority for revising and passing any proposed law,
regulation, or legal amendment that the government (either the president or the cabinet)
wishes to issue. It prepares and submits any new legal text upon request by the government. 106 The president of the legislative branch is also the chief justice of the State Council. 107
The advisory branch is the competent body for providing legal advice to the president, the
cabinet, ministers and public institutions.108 Moreover, any governmental agency has to seek
the acceptance of the advisory branch of the State Council in order to take on, accept, or validate any contract, reconciliation, or arbitration award. 109 To avoid any hassle from the government with the State Council advisory, the law gives the government the right to hire an
advisory branch of the State Council to work as legal advisors to the president, the cabinet,
ministers and public institutions.110

100

Law No. 9 of 1949 (Law of the State Council), al-Waqa’a al-masrayah. 1, Aug. 1949, art. 11 (Egypt).
Law No. 165 of 1955 (Law of State Council), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 29 Mar. 1955, art.1 (Egypt).
102
Law No. 47 of 1972 (Law of State Council), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 1 (Egypt).
103
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 190, 14 Jan. 2014 (stating that State Council
“is exclusively competent to adjudicate in administrative disputes, disciplinary cases and appeals, and
disputes pertaining to its decisions. It is solely competent to issue opinions on the legal issues of bodies to
be determined by law. It reviews and drafts bills and resolutions of a legislative character, and reviews
draft contracts, to which the state or any public entity is a party. Other competencies are to be determined
by law).
104
Law No. 47 of 1972 (Law of State Council), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 3 (Egypt).
105
Id. at art. 11.
106
Id. at art. 59/1.
107
Id. at art. 70.
108
Id. at art. 63.
109
Id. at art. 58/3.
110
Id. at art. 59/1.
101
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Figure (5):
Formulation of the State Council
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(C) The Administrative Prosecution Office (hereinafter APO) was established in September 1954.
The explanatory memorandum of the APO lists the reasons necessitating the establishment of
the APO. First, the APO aims to face all forms of interference in the administrative investigation against senior public officials. 111 Second, the APO is a replacement of several legal departments that are established in each governmental agency or ministry. It is the sole body
responsible for investigating violations by governmental officials. Third, the APO is responsible for providing technical and legal training and education to its members. The agency ensures that all its members obtain the necessary and required training and education. Previous-

111

Law No. 480 of 1954 (Administrative Prosecution Bureau Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 16 Sept.
1954, art.1 (Egypt).
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ly, each legal department was responsible for providing the required legal training to its
members. 112
The development of the APO has undergone three stages. The first took place between the
years 1954 and 1958, when the APO was still an affiliate body of the cabinet. 113 The second
stage unfolded from 1954 to 2014, a period during which the APO was under the supervision
of the Ministry of Justice. 114 In the third stage, from 2012 onwards, APO members started to
lobby for their independence from the executive authority. They sought to eliminate any sort
of interference by the Ministry of Justice. 115 The APO finally achieved independence. 116 It
was also given exclusive authority over “financial and administrative irregularities. Regarding these irregularities, it has the authorities vested in the administration body to inflict disciplinary penalties . . . . It also initiated and conducted proceedings and disciplinary appeals
before the State Council courts in accordance with the law.” 117
B. Judicial organizations
There are three forms of organizations in the judiciary: formal, semi-formal, and informal.
The SJC is the only formal organization in the ordinary judiciary. The process of formulating
the SJC underwent several stages before it reached its current status. The first stage occurred
in 1943. The Independent Judiciary Law (hereinafter IJL) assigned the SJC to handle judicial
issues such as judicial appointments, transfers, and public judicial issues. 118 The SJC consists
of eight members: the president of the Court of Cassation, the representative of the Ministry
of Justice, the president of the Cairo Court of Appeal, the attorney general, an elected member from the public assembly of the Court of Cassation, elected members from the public assembly of the Cairo Court of Appeal, as well as the president of the Cairo Primary Court. 119
The second stage occurred after the amendment of the IJL in 1952, upon the success of the
military coup. 120 The amended Article 34 abolished any form of election in the formulation
of SJC.121 The elected members were replaced with appointed members. Instead of electing
two members –– one member from the public assembly of the Court of Cassation and one
member from the public assembly of the Cairo Court of Appeal –– the two elected members
were the president of the Alexandria Court of Appeal and the first vice president of the Court
of Cassation. 122 In 1956, a new amendment of the SJC was introduced to reflect the unification between Egypt and Syria. The new SJC formulation doubled its membership to include
both Egyptian and Syrian judges. 123 After the dissolution of the union, a new law was issued
in 1965. It returned the formulation of the council to its old form. This form continued to be
in force until 1969.
112

Id.
Id.
114
Law No. 11 of 1989 (Administrative Prosecution Bureau and Disciplinary Courts Law), al-Jarīdah alRasmīyah, 20 April 1989, art.1 (Egypt).
115
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 197 § 1, 14 Jan. 2014 (stating that the Administrative Prosecution is an independent judicial body).
116
Id.
117
Id. at art. 197 § 2.
118
Law No. 66 of 1943 (Judicial Independence Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 12 July 1943, art.36 (Egypt).
119
Id. at art. 34.
120
AMR SHALAKANY, IZDIHĀR WA-INHIYĀR AL-NUKHBA AL-QĀNŪNIYYA AL-MIṢRIYYA 1805-2005, 277 (Dar
Al-Shorouk, 2013).
121
Id.
122
Law No. 66 of 1943 (Judicial Independence Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 12 July 1943, art. 36 (Egypt).
123
Id. at art. 82.
113
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The third stage occurred in 1969. President Nasser unified the SJC with the State Council
board. This new Council was the Supreme Council for Judicial Institutes (hereinafter SCJI).
The main role of the SCJI was to supervise both the ordinary and administrative judiciary.
The aim of the new council was the cooperation between the judicial institutions, to advise
judicial institutes, and to propose judicial legislation to reform the judiciary. The SCJI included members from the ordinary judiciary, the State Council, the PPO, the APO and the
State Case Authority. Even though the administrative judiciary was under cabinet supervision, the ordinary judiciary was an independent entity. As a result, this new formulation
meant compromising judicial independence through the introduction of dependent institutions to the independent judiciary.
The last –– and current –– stage started in 2008. A new amendment was introduced to the
JAL to replace the SCJI with the SJC. The current formulation of the SJC is similar to that
after the 1952 coup. It consists of seven members who represent the various entities inside
the regular judiciary. They are the president of the Court of Cassation, the first vice president
of the Court of Cassation, the Cairo Court of Appeal president, the Alexandria Court of Appeal president, the Mansoura Court of Appeal president (instead of the representative of the
Ministry of Justice, as well as the attorney general. 124
The Judges’ Club (hereinafter Club), established in 1939, is the only semi-formal organization within the judiciary. Its semi-formal nature is due to two reasons. First, there is no formal judicial assignment or law that underpins the Club. Second, the Club includes all members of the judiciary, both judges and prosecutors. Additionally, the Club’s nature is controversial because it incorporates legal, social, and political aspects. In legal terms, the Club has
no special law and is not mentioned in the JAL. The Club was established as a nongovernmental organization. It has its own bylaws, which were negotiated and set by judges and
prosecutors. They include the rules of election to the Club board as well as administrative
and financial issues. The Club’s major focus is its social aspect. The main club is located in
Cairo, with several other clubs located in various governorates. The administration of these
clubs is non-centralized, as each of them has its own board. Any judge or prosecutor can be a
member of one or more of these clubs. As for its political role, the Club has, on numerous
occasions, interfered in politics. 125 This role, however, is exceptional. The JAL bans judges
and courts from pursuing any form of political involvement. 126 In the past decade, this type
of interference has occurred twice. 127 The first time was after the election fraud in 2005,
while the second time was during the period of rule of the Muslim Brotherhood.
In its contemporary history, the Egyptian judicial system identifies three informal organizations. They are the Secret Organization Tanziem Sarie al-Tali’I (hereinafter Tanziem), the
Independent Judicial Movement Qoda’ al-Istqlal (hereinafter IJM), and the Judges for Egypt,
known as Qoda’ men-ajl-Misr (hereinafter JFE). The informal nature of these organizations
is also based on two reasons. First, they have no legal status, and, secondly, not all judges are
members of such organizations.

124

Id. at art. 77.
Atef Shahat Said, The Role of Judge’s Club in Enhancing the Independence of the Judiciary and Spurring
Political
Reform, 115 in JUDGES AND POLITICAL REFORM IN EGYPT (Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron ed., 2015).
126
Id.
127
Id.
125
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The first organization, Tanziem, was established during the period of President Nasser. It included several judges who held leading positions within the Ministry of Justice and the PPO.
For example, Judge Ali Nour Al-Din was appointed as the attorney general. 128 Judge Sadak
al-Mahdi was appointed as vice Minister of Justice. 129 President Sadat dissolved the Tanziem. Due to its secretive nature, there is a lack of official data regarding its current status.
The second informal organization is the Judicial Independence Movement (JIM), which was
established after the judicial massacre in 1969. From 1970 through to 2010, many judges
formed the JIM. They organized secret meetings to support their goal of judicial reform. The
leading figures of this movement were Hossam El Gheriani, 130 Ahmed Mikky, 131 and
Hesham Genenia. 132 They were, however, unable to enforce any judicial reform and blacklisted by the government. After the January 25 Revolution, many of the IJM members were
appointed to high-ranking judicial and political positions, as a symbol of the political will to
reform the judiciary.
The third informal organization is the JFE. This organization was established after the January 25 Revolution. There are allegations that the JFE is connected to the MB. Waled Sharabi,
one of the group’s leaders, was photographed leaving the MB headquarters. After ousting exPresident Mohamed Morsi, Waled Sharabi was impeached. Additionally, the JFE condemned
the 2013 military coup in a written statement. This statement was read out in public in Rab’a
Square. As a result, members of the group were either impeached or are still awaiting impeachment proceedings.
III. JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT IN EGYPT
A. Qualifications for Judicial Appointment
The required judicial qualifications in Egypt are relatively few, compared with German or
French requirements of judicial education. 133 Even though the Egyptian legal system is greatly influenced by the French system, 134 judicial requirements in Egypt are similar to those of
128

Ayman Gazi, Counselor Rifat al-Sayed: The Structure Helped Abdel Nasser in the Massacre of Judges,
ROSALIEOUF DAILY, April 22, 2010, http://www.masress.com/rosadaily/58440.
129
Id.
130
Gheriani headed the Supreme Judicial Council from June 2011 to July 2012. He was appointed as the President of
the Constitute Assembly in 2012. David Kipkpatrick, Egyptian Islamists Approve Draft Constitution Despite
Objections, NY TIMES, November 29, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/30/world/middleeast/paneldrafting-egypts-constitution-prepares-quick-vote.html.
131
Sayed Gamaleddine, Egypt’s Justice Minister Ahmed Mekki Resigns: Judicial Source, AHRAM ONLINE,
(April 21, 2013), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/69781/Egypt/Politics-BREAKING-Justiceminister-Ahmed-Mekk
i-resigns-Judi.aspx.
132
Khaled Hassam, Egypt’s Former Top Auditor Says his Trial is Political, AL-MONITOR, (June 23, 2016),
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/09/egypt-corruption-hisham-geneina-sentence-interview.html.
133
Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Olga Shvetsova, Comparing Judicial Selection Systems, 10 WM, & MARY BILL
RTS J.
7, 11 (2001); see also Harold Laski, The Technique Appointment, 24 MICH L. REV. 529, 524 (1926).
134
Mohamed Abdelaal, Religious Constitutionalism in Egypt: A Case Study, 37 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 35,
43 (2013); see Ahmad Alshorbagy, On The Failure of a Legal Transplant: The Case of Egyptian Takeover Law,
22 IND. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 237, 239 (2012); see also Enid Hill, Comparative and Historical Study of Modern Middle Eastern Law,
26 AM. J. COMP. L. 278, 279 (1978).
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the United States, and the United Kingdom. 135 In the past, judicial education in Egypt was
influenced by the British system of appointment. In the monarchic systems, the king had absolute authority over the choice of judges. 136 This is no longer the case in contemporary judicial appointment requirements. Many educational requirements have been introduced without
having a legislative mandate. The current form of judicial education requirements is based on
three major aspects: judicial education, pre-appointment judicial training, and postappointment judicial training.
The first aspect of judicial qualification is judicial education. The Judicial Authority Law
(JAL) does not require any form of training beyond the required law degree. 137 Nonetheless,
the law grants the right to certain categories of lawyers to apply for judicial positions. In theory, Article 39 stipulates a category for those claiming the right for appointment in the judiciary. Potential candidates should fulfill one of the following conditions:
1.
have previous work experience as a judge or have worked in a similar position according to the law;
2.
be a senior public prosecutor;
3.
be a public prosecutor with four years’ experience;
4.
be a junior judge with the State Council, a junior lawyer at the state litigation authority, or a senior administrative prosecutor;
5.
as a lawyer, be eligible to work at the Court of Appeal for four years, and
have a working experience of nine years; or
6.
be a law professor, having held this position for at least nine years. 138
In practice, however, judicial appointment in the primary courts is restricted to senior public
prosecutors who have reached the age of 30. 139 This is a tradition based on Article 49. 140
As for the Court of Appeal, the only way to appoint judges is by way of seniority: Judges
must be at least 43 years old and have at least 10 years of experience working in lower
courts. 141 This discrepancy between theory and practice goes back to the authority in charge
of appointment, –– the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC). In the last 20 years, the SJC has
never opened the door to any other category except, on two occasions, to appoint female
judges. 142 There are currently only 68 female judges. 143 The SJC has neither issued a state135

See Godfrey Philips, Dominions and the United Kingdom, 4 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 164, 164-65 (1932); see also
Sally Kenney, United Kingdom’s Judicial System Undergoes Major Reform, 87 JUDICATURE 79, 81 (2003).
136
John Dodd et. al, The Case for Judicial Appointment, THE FEDERALIST SOC’Y, (2003),
http://www.fedsoc.org/ publications/detail/the-case-for-judicial-appointments.
137
See generally Adel Omar Sherif, Overview of the Egyptian Judicial System, and its History, 5 Y.B. ISLAMIC
&
MIDDLE E. L. 3, 12 (1998) (stating that a law degree is required to appoint as a prosecutor, which is the
only practical path to be appointed as a judge).
138
Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 39 (Egypt).
139
Joining the Public Prosecutor Bureau is usually the first step for judicial appointment. Article 38 of the JAL
mandates only one educational requirement: a Bachelor of Laws. Judicial candidates must be: 1) an Egyptian
national, 2) not less than 30 years old, 3) holding a Bachelor of Laws from a law school in Egypt, or a foreign
comparable degree, 4) without a criminal or disciplinary record, even if the candidate is participating in any
criminal rehabilitation process, and 5) be of good standing and reputation. Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 38 (Egypt).
140
Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 49 (Egypt)
(stating that “the selection of court judges of first instance of class (B) [is] by way of promotion from
members of the prosecution on the basis of their seniority, work and inspection reports.”).
141
Id. at art. 116.
142
Ahmed El Sayed, Female Judges in Egypt, 13. Y. B. ISLAMIC & MIDDLE E. L. 135, 135-36 (2006).
143
Id. at 136.
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ment prohibiting the appointment of other categories nor opened up applications to these categories. 144 As a result, appointment is restricted to senior public prosecutors.
The second aspect concerns pre-appointment judicial training. The National Center of Judicial Studies (hereinafter NCJS) is the body responsible for providing training to judges and
prosecutors. 145 It was established in 1981. 146 It is the principal institute in charge of providing
specialized training to judges throughout their professional careers. 147 It falls under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice, which is the competent authority for appointing the
NCJS director, following approval by the SJC.148 The NCJS director is also the chair of the
its board, which consists of the director, attorney general, four judges, and four experts appointed by the Minister of Justice. 149
There is no formal mandate for pre-appointment training in judicial appointment. 150 Law
schools and the judiciary do not recognize judicial internships, even though the judiciary suffers from financial problems and a severe shortage of judges and prosecutors. 151 In practice,
some law firms do hire law students on an informal basis to help them acquire legal expertise. Law students are not authorized to formally appear in courts, even under the supervision
of a senior attorney. The judicial systems in the United States and Germany, by contrast, are
based on providing judicial externships to law students. 152
Judicial pre-training for judges differs from that for prosecutors. 153 In theory, the JAL does
not mandate any pre-academic or professional training, and judges do not require any additional training. 154 The JAL implicitly requires these types of training by limiting the appointment to certain categories of lawyers. It requires training by virtue of the appointment of
judges from diverse backgrounds. In practice, the JAL provides equal opportunity to other
candidates –– including law professors, administrative prosecutors, and lawyers –– to ensure
diversity in legal training.
Limiting the appointment process to senior public prosecutors triggers a necessity for prejudicial training. Public prosecution training is limited to criminal law. 155 All prosecutors in
Egypt lack the necessary training in other legal fields –– such as civil law, commercial law,
and labor law. The Ministry of Justice and the SJC mandate such training for new judges.
The aim of this training is to fill the gap between theory and practice. The entire pool of candidates is obliged to undergo a one-month training program during their last summer at the
Public Prosecution Bureau (PPO).
144
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146
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Law No. 347 of 1981 (National Center for Judicial Studies Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 2 July 1981, art. 4
(Egypt).
149
Id. art. 3.
150
Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 116/1 (Egypt).
151
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See generally ALAA AL- DIN ARAFAT, THE MUBARAK LEADERSHIP AND FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT,
232 (2009)(“stating that shortage of judges will be filled with prosecutors and government lawyers”); See generally, AL ARABIYA NEWS, Egypt to hold referendum in two stages due to shortage of judges, (Dec. 11, 2012),
https://english.alarab iya.net/articles/2012/12/11/254547.html.
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The absence of pre-appointment training –– such as judicial clerkships –– at law schools is
due to law schools do not coordinate with the Ministry of Justice or private law firms to offer
legal training to their students. 156 This approach by law firms, while seemingly inexplicable,
may be attributed to a tradition of centralized decisions of educational policies in Egypt. 157
There are two institutions that govern the totality of the educational structure in Egypt. The
first is the Ministry of Education, which supervises “all post-secondary education, planning,
policy formulation, and quality control activities.” 158 The second is the Supreme Council of
Universities, which formulates “the overall policy of university education and scientific research in universities, and determines the number of students to be admitted to each university, each year.” 159 As a general rule, these two entities never coordinate with the Ministry of
Justice or the Supreme Judicial Council to offer legal education to judges. The Ministry of
Justice and the SJC only depend on the NCJS to offer legal education to their members.
The third aspect is post-judicial appointment training. The PPO believes that “the best way to
learn how to fight is to have one.” New prosecutors start their careers without any training
until the end of the first two years of their appointment. 160 During these years, each district
attorney aide is assigned to a senior public prosecutor for supervision and guidance. 161 The
role of the NCJS starts at the end of the first two years of appointment, when junior prosecutors undergo a three-month training period at the NCJS. Training provides major help in rectifying various common mistakes that are committed during the first two years of practical
experience. 162 As far as judges are concerned, there is no requirement for formal continuing
education, except for judges at the State Council, who are required to hold a master’s degree.
As for professional training, the NJSC offers training courses to junior and senior judges that
are not mandatory. Other types of training are largely unregulated and depend mainly on
funding provided by the Ministry of Justice. 163
B. The Authority of Appointment
The SJC and the president share the power of appointment for new judges and prosecutors. Article 44 of the JAL authorizes the president to assign judicial appointment following approval by the SJC.164 Nevertheless, the borderline between the authority of the
156
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(Feb. 8, 2016), https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/8214/european-experts-shareexperiences-national-centre-judicial-studies-and-judicial-information.
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See generally Jamie Boex, Democratization in Egypt: The Potential Role of Decentralization, URBAN
INSTITUTE CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT & GOVERNANCE, POLICY BRIEF, (Feb. 2011),
https://www.urban.org/sites
/default/files/publication/27151/412301-Democratization-in-Egypt-ThePotential-Role-of-Decentralization.PDF.
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EDUCATION, AUDIOVISUAL AND CULTURE EXECUTIVE AGENCY, Higher Education in Egypt, (2004),
http://eac ea.ec.europa.eu/tempus/participating_countries/impact/egypt.pdf.
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Id.
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Judicial Instruction Manual for Prosecutors, art.795.
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Id.
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Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 44 (Egypt) (stating
that “the appointment of judicial positions, either through appointment or promotion, is a matter of decision of
the President of the Republic … after taking consulting with SJC.” The article further stipulates “appointment
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president and the SJC remains unclear. 165 The following paragraphs aim to illustrate the
role of each in the appointment process. They show how the executive body enjoys some
advantages over the SJC in the appointment process. This process can be divided into six
stages. The first starts with the announcement of the SJC vacancy in the local media,
which is meant to induce fresh graduates to join the public prosecution. A public call for
candidates is published in two widely distributed national newspapers, as shown in Figure (1). The advertisement states the terms and conditions for the application. It specifies
when application forms will be made available as well as the deadline for submitting the
application. After submitting the application, the SJC selects candidates, who meet the
minimum requirement, primarily a law degree with a general grade of “Good,” 166 and
sets a date for interviews.
Figure (1): Advertisement of judicial appointment in public newspapers. 167

The Arab Republic of Egypt
The Public Prosecution Bureau announces it is
accepting applications for the vacancy of
Aide to District Attorney
Graduating class of 2012
Overall grade of “Good”
Applications can be obtained between
14/12/2013 to 24/12/2013
The application submission period is from 1/1/2014 to
24/1/2014

Candidates must submit all required credentials mentioned on the advertisement board in the Court of Cassation. If requirements are not met, applications will
not be accepted. Applications submitted either before
or after the deadline will not be considered.

of the heads of the courts of appeal, and the deputies and consultant, presidents of primary courts, judges is finalized after the approval of SJC.”).
165
Id.
166
The advertisement can be found on public printed newspapers.
167.
The only legal exception is in the case of appointing assistant public prosecutors. Since 2006, no one
has been directly
appointed to be an assistant public prosecutor. The SJC has never disclosed the reason why this employment
method is not used. This appointment process is based on Article 116 of JAL. It states “no one can be appointed in the position of assistant public prosecutor, except the aide of district attorney, unless the candidate
passes a comprehensive exam.” Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct.
1972, art. 116 (Egypt).
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The second stage is the exam or SJC interview stage. In theory, the JAL does not stipulate
any entrance test requirement. 168 In practice, however, the SJC schedules interviews for all
applicants with the aim of deliberating over the candidates’ legal ability. Candidates are
asked three criminal law questions, one of which they have to address correctly. At the conclusion of the interview stage, the SJC does not reveal the results to candidates; only successful candidates are informed about their success. The whole process takes place over a period
of 12 months starting from the date of the interview. The SJC sends names of potential candidates to the Ministry of Justice to commence the third stage.
The third stage starts once the Ministry of Justice is in possession of the names of all the successful applicants. During this stage, the Ministry of Justice carries out all the required security and background checks. It coordinates with the Ministry of the Interior to obtain criminal
and political record clearances, which make up the fourth stage. The JAL does not clearly
specify which crimes have the potential to block a candidate’s appointment. In general, however, candidates should have no criminal, disciplinary, or rehabilitating records. 169 Candidates should be of good standing and reputation. 170 The connotation of “good and bad” reputation is left to the discretion of the SJC and the security agencies. 171
If the candidate’s record is cleared, the application goes through the second step in the background check process, which involves the candidate’s family’s criminal record. 172 In theory,
the background check is limited to that of the candidate only. In practice, however, the SJC
and the Ministry of Justice extend their securities check to include all the candidate’s family
members up to the fourth degree of kinship (second cousins and their spouses). 173 In their
application, candidates are required to fill out a family-tree form. This form includes the
names, addresses, and employment statuses of family members up to the fourth degree. It
includes parents, grandparents, siblings, uncles, and cousins, as well as their respective

168

Id.
Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct.1972, art. 38 (Egypt)
(states that a candidate should not have a criminal record and have a good reputation).
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Id.
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Id.
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Shams Al Din Al Hajjaji, A Call for Judicial Reform in Egypt, 11 VIENNA J. INT’L CONST. L. 257, 280
(2017).
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spouses. 174 Both the candidates and their fathers are required to submit fingerprints to verify
their criminal history. In the event of a crime having been committed by a member of the
candidate’s family, the SJC immediately eliminates the candidate from its pool of appointees. 175
The fourth stage gives the National Security Agency (NSA) the authority to investigate the
candidates’ –– as well as their families’ –– political affiliation. The SJC and the Ministry of
Justice practice a zero-tolerance policy regarding political history, specifically with regard to
any affiliation with Islamist or liberal parties or groups. 176 In theory, there is no direct legal
foundation calling for candidates to be checked by the NSA; however, it has been argued that
Article 73, regarding the prohibition of political participation of both judges and courts, also
applies to potential members of the judiciary. In practice, the Ministry of Justice is the only
competent authority for coordinating between the SJC and the NSA. This step is not made
public by the SJC to the candidates. However, if a candidate chooses to challenge the requirement of a security check of his relatives, he is instantly eliminated from the list of candidates. 177 Automatic exclusion is thus applied without any justification.
The fifth stage is a required medical examination involving blood and urine sampling, the
aim of which is to ensure that candidates are free of alcohol and drug dependencies. In theory, the JAL does not mandate such a test for potential candidates. 178 However, in practice, the
SJC and the Ministry of Justice require such tests for each candidate. Even though the law
does not stipulate such a requirement, candidates cannot refuse to take the test. Candidates
who fail the tests are excluded from the list of candidates. 179 This medical test is for firsttime appointees only; when prosecutors are promoted to judges, there is no such requirement.
The same applies if a junior judge is promoted to work at the Court of Appeal, the Court of
Cassation or the SCC.
In stage six, a presidential appointment decree is issued for the appointment of new appointees. The JAL gives the President the ultimate authority to issue the decree of appointment of
judges and aides to public prosecutors. 181 The names of the accepted candidates are published in “two widely distributed newspapers.” 182 Moreover, candidates have to take the judicial oath before the Minister of Justice. The oath reads: “I swear by the almighty God to
judge among people with justice and respect to laws.” This oath will next be sworn when a
senior prosecutor is promoted to judge. An oath is required only when a judge is appointed
174

Appendix 3 of the Public Prosecution Bureau Appointment Application contains chats of the applicant’s
family
members. Each candidate must complete this appendix at the best of his knowledge. It is important to know that
such
appendix also exists in the police and army academies to ensure that no police or army officer has any political
affiliations. The application is not available to the public.
175
Id.
176
See VETO, Judicial Source: Exclusion of the Brotherhood from appointment movement in the Attorney
General, (July 7, 2013), http://www.v etogate.com/447110.
177
This information is required in the application for the aide to the district attorney. The application asks about
a lot of
information with regards to the candidate and his family’s history. It also requires disclosure of any travel or
relation with international organizations. See Maysar Yassin, al-watan tanshor shorowt al-taqadam lewazefat
ma’awn al-nayabah, WATEN NEWSPAPER, http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/602292.
178
Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 118 (Egypt).
179
See Tarek Hafez, Wokala al-nayabah aljodod yodown al-kashf al-tabi we-yanhown ijrahat t’ynahom,
MASRESS, (July 13, 2014), http://www.masress.com/elfagr/1641454.
181
Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 44 (Egypt).
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attorney general, president of the Court of Cassation, or judge at the SCC.183 In each of these
cases, the appointee takes the oath before the president. 184
When prosecutors are promoted to judges at the age of 30, there is no requirement of passing
the previously described five stages –– only stage six applies. 185 The SJC forwards the names
of the successful prosecutors to the president to issue the presidential appointment decree.
New judges are then sworn in before the SJC. This is because the Court of Cassation is the
competent authority for selecting and appointing new judges to the court. 186 The Court of
Cassation is the supreme court for the ordinary judiciary, except for administrative and constitutional disputes. The same rule applies to the SCC.187 As far as the appointment of the
attorney general is concerned, the SJC is the competent authority for appointment.
Before 2014, the president had ultimate authority over appointing the attorney general. 188
However, the 2014 Constitution transferred this authority over to the SJC. 189 After the assassination of Attorney General Hesham Barakat in 2015, 190 the appointment of the new attorney general was delayed for more than six months. 191 The reason for the delay was that the
president wished to appoint the new attorney general, while the SJC upheld its constitutional
right to do so itself. 192 Following this struggle, the SJC successfully appointed the new attorney general, Nabil Sadek. As for the judicial oath, it still has to be taken before the president. 193
IV. CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES IN JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT
A. Exclusion based on Class
The first category of candidates excluded from the appointment process is candidates from
humble backgrounds. The history of this exclusion dates a long way back––even to before
183

Id. at art. 71.
Id. at art. 44.
185
The 2014 Constitution considers Public Prosecution Bureau as an integral part of the judiciary. Thus, SJC
plays a major role in the appointment of new prosecutors. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT,
art.189 § 1, 14 Jan. 2014 (stating that “the public prosecution is an integral part of the judiciary. It is responsible
for investigating, pressing charges and prosecuting all criminal cases except what is exempted by law. The law
establishes the public prosecution’s other competencies.”).
186
Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct.1972, art. 44 (Egypt).
187
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 193 § 3, 14 Jan. 2014 (stating that “the General Assembly chooses the Court’s President from among the most senior three vice-presidents of the court. It also
chooses the vice-presidents and the members of its Commissioners Authority, who are appointed by a decree
from the President of the Republic. The foregoing takes place in the manner defined by the law.”).
188
Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 44 and 119
(Egypt).
189
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 189 § 2, 14 Jan. 2014 (stating that “public prosecution is carried out by a Prosecutor General who is selected by the Supreme Judicial Council from among the
Deputies to the President of the Court of Cassation, the Presidents of the Court of Appeals or the Assistant
Prosecutor Generals, by virtue of a presidential decree for a period of four years, or for the period remaining
until retirement age, whichever comes first, and only once during a judge’s career.”).
190
BBC NEWS, Egypt Prosecutor Hisham Barakat Killed in Cairo attack, (June 29, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33308518.
191
Mariam Jabal, Khlaf Dostori Yoajal Iktiar al-Na’b al-Am, ALBAWABA NEWS, Sept. 11, 2015,
http://www.albawab hnews.co m/1493128.
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Id.
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AHRAM ONLINE, Nabil Sadek Sworn in by Sisi as Egypt’s New prosecutor general, (Sept. 19, 2015),
http://english.ahram
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the beginning of the Republic era. During the monarchy, the king had ultimate authority to
appoint judges. Article 7 of the 1947 Judicial Independence Law states that “the appointment
of judges is carried out through a monarchical decree.” 194 The 1952 coup overthrew the
monarchy. 195 It proposed that the domination of the upper class in society should come to an
end. One of the promises of the revolution was to increase the appointment of less-privileged
social classes within the army, the police, and the judiciary — a promise that still remains to
be fulfilled. 196
The lower classes have faced great obstacles for decades. Successive regimes have covertly
inhibited the underprivileged from obtaining equal access to public jobs, especially judicial
appointments. Even if candidates are high-achieving students of law, they still face major
challenges in joining the judiciary. 197 In 2011, 138 candidates claimed they were rejected
from the appointment process because their parents did not hold a university degree. 198 Exclusion of the underprivileged has been brought to the attention of the SJC several times. The
issue, however, has not been overtly acknowledged or justified in any official statement. 199
Even though the SJC has never declared its reason for this type of elimination, the Minister
of Justice recently set forth his position. In May 2015, the Minister of Justice, Judge Mahfouz
Saber, was asked during a television interview whether “the son of a garbage collector stood
any chance of appointment as a public prosecutor.” 200 He replied that “the judge should be
from a proper social class … with all due respect to garbage collectors, and to those below or
above him … a proper environment, and a good social class is necessary … I am not saying
he should be an aristocrat ... I am saying the class should not be very low.” 201 As a result of
this statement, Saber resigned from office a week later.
The SJC did not deny the above statement. 202 It is common knowledge that underprivileged
citizens do not have an equal chance in the appointment process. Saber’s resignation was not
the result of an untruthful statement by the Minister; rather, it was for expressing in public a
truth that has for decades remained unspoken. Members of the lower social classes find it difficult to secure judicial or prosecution jobs.
Such inequality favors judges’ sons and other relatives, who make up an undeclared quota. 203
The president of the Judges’ Club, Judge Ahmed Al-Zend, asserts that “appointing judges’
children will continue … there is no single force in Egypt that can stop such a practice.” 204
The Club is the only democratic organization within the Egyptian judiciary. 205 His statement
194
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197
See Mahmoud Al-masry, Istba’ad Ta’ynat al-nayabah besabab mo’hel al-waladiyn aw al-faqr, ALBAWA
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(2017).
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elzahf almoqasas, AHRAM (Sept. 3, 2012), http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/182259.aspx.
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was considered the first official statement from an official member in the judiciary with regard to this hidden quota. Prior to Al-Zend’s statement, there was a covert consensus of giving preference to children and relatives of members of the judiciary. It was not until later that
the press tracked down the appointees and their relatives. Successive reports were published
in the local newspaper, Al Shorouk. The first report came out in 2013, 206 and revealed that
more than 114 out of 475 appointees (24%) in the Public Prosecution Office were relatives of
members of the judiciary. 207 In 2014, this percentage increased from 25% to 35%: Out of 485
district attorney aide appointees, 168 were relatives of judges. 208 The report showed that 87
candidates had parents working in the Court of Appeal, 11 candidates had parents working in
the Court of Cassation, and 55 candidates had parents who were judges or prosecutors. 209
Both reports revealed the names of the candidates and their kinship to members of the judiciary. 210
B. Exclusion based on Gender
In theory, there is no legal barrier to the appointment of women as judges or prosecutors.
Furthermore, successive judicial laws have not prohibited women from joining the bench.
The language of the JAL is very clear in referring to candidates in a gender-neutral form.
Moreover, advertisements for judicial vacancies never state that positions are restricted to
male candidates. 211 In practice, however, women have limited access to joining the bench as
judges or criminal prosecutors. The question of appointing women in the judiciary was raised
for the first time in 1951. Professor Aisha Rateb, who went on to become Egypt’s first female
ambassador, was the first woman to apply for the position of judge on the State Council. 212
Her request was denied. She sued the State Council’s administration for denying her request.
She fought her case all the way to the Supreme Administrative Court. 213 Abdel Razzak AlSanhuri, the founder of modern administrative and civil laws, also denied her appeal as
president of the Supreme Administrative Court. 214 He stated that there were no barriers
against the appointment of women, except on administrative grounds. Hence, the decision to
exclude the applicant was sustained as long as there was no evidence of misuse of power
against the claimant. 215 The ban on women joining the bench continued until 2007, with two
AHRAM ONLINE (Mar. 6, 2014), http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/96037.aspx.
206
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SHOROUK, (July 17, 2014), http://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=17072014&id=52446ae9860f-4183-8c4c-31818a678860.
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EARL SULLIVAN, WOMEN IN EGYPTIAN PUBLIC LIFE: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 82
(Syracuse U. Press, 1986).
213
Ahmed el-Sayed, Female Judges in Egypt, 13 Y.B. ISLAMIC & MIDDLE E. L. 135, 135-36 (20062007).
214
Supreme Administrative Court, case no. 30, session of 2 Feb. 1952 (stating that “the limitation of some jobs
–ordinary judiciary and state council– to men only, and excluding women, is based on administration’s
discretion. Administration enjoys discretion over determining the suitability of any candidate, according to the
nature of a certain appointment. The administration can also base its decision on the customs and surrounding
environment. This shall not be interpreted as underestimating the value of women and their dignity. It shall not
also underestimate their intellectual, cultural, and educational level. It shall not also prejudice their rights. However, it is the choice of the administration to determine the suitability of certain jobs, per the administration discretionary authority. The administration shall not prejudge the principle of legal equality.”)
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exceptions. First, women were allowed to join the administrative prosecution bureau, where
they make up 25%. 216 Second, Justice Tahani Al-Gebali was the first and last justice to join
the SCC.217 In 2007, the exception extended to a new initiative to open the door for women
to join the bench. 218 This initiative was limited to female administrative prosecutors who
wished to join the ordinary judiciary. As a result, 31 female administrative prosecutors were
able to join the ordinary judiciary as judges. 219
One of the major drawbacks affecting the progress of women’s appointment in the judiciary
was the refusal of the State Council to recognize their right to be appointed. In 2010, the
State Council announced it would be accepting nominations of female applicants to join the
bench. However, this decision triggered major opposition from the Public Assembly. The
Public Assembly called for an urgent meeting to challenge the decision of the board. In the
meantime, 24 female candidates filled out their applications. Before the closing date and during the submission period, the State Council Public Assembly (compromising the entirety of
the judges working at the State Council) held an urgent session to nullify the decision of the
State Council board to appoint women. This decision led to innumerable debates surrounding
the reasons and motives behind such a step. 220 It has instigated many protests from the feminist movement in Egypt, many of which have expressed concern about the future of equality
in the country. The movement has thus far succeeded in imposing its demands.
Justice Adel Farghaly, a member of the Public Assembly of the State Council, summarized
the argument in favor of excluding women from judicial appointment. First, he distinguished
between rights and obligations. He considered the joining of the judiciary an obligation rather
than a right. 221 He maintained that Egyptian men have obligations, such as mandatory military service, that women are exempt from. 222 He stated that the “refusal to appoint women to
senior judicial positions has always been based on the fact that Egyptian women are not
asked to perform military service and ‘offer sacrifice’ like men.” He went on to say that
women occupy judicial functions in western countries because they perform military service
and perform jobs equal to those of men, including acts of physical labor.” 223 Second, judges
and prosecutors are required to relocate to different districts every three to five years. This
continuous relocation process would not suit the nature of women. He stated that “judicial
216
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work in Egypt is not suitable for women, as they cannot balance their work and personal life
duties. They have always been the major care providers for their families, unlike men.” 224
Currently, there is a constitutional mandate for the judicial appointment of women, opening
doors for women to join the bench. Nevertheless, by late 2016, the SJC had not appointed
any new female candidates to join the PPO or the bench. 225 The 2014 Constitution leaves the
debate to the discretion of the administration to appoint women to fill judicial vacancies. Article 9 eliminates any form of discrimination against women. It states that “the state ensures
equal opportunity for all citizens without discrimination.” 226 Additionally, Article 11 mandates that the administration appoint women in the judiciary. It explicitly states the right of
women to secure official judiciary posts. This inhibits any argument by the administration
that it cannot accommodate women in certain posts. 227
C. Exclusion based on Political Affiliation
The JAL bans both courts and judges from both declaring their political opinions and participating in any political forum. 228 This ban is restricted to judges and courts. Nevertheless, the
SJC and the Ministry of Justice have extended the ban to judicial candidates. Their practice
continues to exclude any candidates with a political affiliation. Even though political orientation is not a crime, there is a marked tendency to exclude candidates for their or their families’ political affiliation. This tendency allows the NSA to interfere in the appointment process, as it can exclude any candidate for these reasons.
The NSA, which carries out the security check on candidates, is notorious for its ambiguity
and lack of transparency in the background check process. It is widely known that police performance is corrupt and lacks transparency. 229 Moreover, candidates have no access to their
security files and are unable to appeal their security status in the case of exclusion.230 The
NSA does not reveal to candidates the content of their files, which are treated with a great
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deal of confidentiality. 231 There has never been a comprehensible reason why these reports
are handled in such a manner.
While having family NDP affiliations does not stop candidates from joining the bench, any
affiliation to Islamist group –– like the Muslim Brotherhood –– is considered a political affiliation, resulting in instant elimination from candidacy. Currently, the ban on political participation is restricted to Islamist political affliction. 232 The absence of real political parties in
Egypt before the 2011 revolution has resulted in the Muslim Brotherhood being the only serious political competitor of the National Democratic Party (NDP). 233 NDP-affiliated officials banned the Muslim Brotherhood both before January 2011 and after July 2013. 234 The
dominant political parties in the country were either the NDP or the Muslim Brotherhood. 235
The meaning of politics in socialist and post-socialist countries is always vague. 236 It is based
on an ideology that bans the coexistence of other ideologies. 237 During the socialist era, there
was always just one political party –– first the Arab Socialist Union, established in 1962, and
later the NDP, which was established in 1978. 238 They were the major dominant parties that
no other political party dared challenge. 239 The NDP has always won the majority of seats in
both houses. The dominant political parties in the country were either the NDP or the Muslim
Brotherhood. 240 In 1995, the NDP won 415 out of 520 seats, 241 and in 2000 it won 388. 242 In
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2005, it won 311 seats, while the Muslim Brotherhood won 88 seats. 243 In the 2010 elections
–– the last before it was dissolved –– the NDP won a total of 473 seats. 244 The absence of
real political parties in Egypt before the 2011 Revolution has resulted in the Muslim Brotherhood being the only serious political competitor of the NDP. 245 The Muslim Brotherhood
won the majority after NDP members were banned from running for election in the first
elected parliament after the 2011 revolution. 246
V. PROPOSED REFORM OF EGYPTIAN JUDICIARY
This paper recommends the following three major reforms to the appointment system. First,
the SJC must be reformed. The need for a reform of the SJC is primarily due to a lack of
checks and balances, as shown in the comparative cases of the United States and Germany.
Historically, the Egyptian judiciary has never accepted the interference of the president in
choosing its members, as illustrated by the example of the dispute that arose between the SJC
and the president surrounding the appointment of the attorney general in 2015.
Moreover, the new SJC shall not include any members of the legislative authority until the
idea of public participation is widely accepted among judges. Egypt has no independent
House of Representatives. In the 2015 parliamentary elections, allegations emerged that the
Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate (GID) had interfered. Hazem Abdel Azim, a former member of President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi’s presidential campaign, stated that the “For the
love of Egypt” political alliance, which won all 120 closed-list seats, was established under
the supervision of the GID and that meetings surrounding its establishment were held at GID
headquarters.” 247 As a result, any reform based on the participation of either executive or legislative authority would face major resistance from the judicial community.
Second, the SJC is the competent authority for appointing judges and prosecutors. 248 As indicated earlier, it is not democratically formulated. The appointment authority should be separate from the SJC. The judicial appointment process should be assigned to an independent
body that includes judges, lawyers, law professors and representatives from the public. The
role of this body would be to separate the authority of impeachment from that of appointment. The new appointment authority would ensure equal treatment for diverse candidates
and counter discrimination. 249 As shown previously, there is a long history of discrimination
against women and the underprivileged in particular, despite such discrimination being unlawful and prohibited. 250 Potentially, this reform will impact and promote the inclusion of
women, the underprivileged, and political minorities.
243
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As far as gender equality is concerned, the 2014 Constitution mandates the appointment of
women in the judiciary. 251 However, in the past two years, women have not had an equal
chance of appointment in both the ordinary and the administrative judiciary. 252 The SJC continues to ban women from joining the judiciary, as it has done before with quotas for lawyers
in appointments. 253 The JAL stipulates two quotas for lawyers to be appointed as judges and
prosecutors. Article 47 states that the yearly quota should be no less than 25% for the appointment of judges in primary courts and 10% for appointments in the Court of Appeal. 254
Article 118 states that the quota of lawyers shall be no less than 25% of the total appointees
each year for the Prosecution Bureau. 255
With regard to candidates who are underprivileged and/or political minorities, the SJC would
include members of the legal community, such as law professors and lawyers. The underprivileged and political minorities who meet the appointment requirements would obtain support
from non-judge members of the SJC, while judges would be more objective in their rejection
of underprivileged candidates. Both professors and lawyers would represent the conscience
of the legal profession. Even though disagreements exist between lawyers and judges, there
is still a great deal of mutual respect among members of the legal community in Egypt. The
underprivileged and political minorities, along with other members of the judiciary, would
benefit from increased diversity in the SJC.
Third, there are three new judicial requirements that should be added to the current appointment requirements, namely raising education standards, 256 introducing judicial internship
programs for law graduates, 257 and banning any political reports from appointment requirements. 258 Education standards need to be improved. 259 Stipulating only minimum education
requirements leaves the door open for mediocre candidates, especially given the increasing
number of law graduates in Egypt. 260 Including higher educational standards –– such as a
legal diploma or LLM –– can improve the appointment requirements, such as a legal diploma
or LLM. 262 This will not result in an added financial burden for candidates, as the cost of one
diploma at Cairo University is less than $100. 262
As far as training prior to appointment is concerned, this must be introduced to the Egyptian
legal system. The implementation of this system would achieve four purposes. First, it would
provide law students with a deeper perspective on the intricacies of the court system. 263 Second, law interns would contribute to judges’ efforts in research, data collection, editing and
writing. Third, interns would come at no additional cost to the judiciary, because they gain
251
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knowledge in exchange for their services. 264 And finally, at the end of their internships, interns are and would be given assessment reports that could later be used as additional references during the appointment process. 265 As for the political reports requirement, banning
such reports would end the executive authority’s influence on the nomination process. Active
political affiliation of judicial members can be legally handled through an impeachment process, 266 while executive intervention cannot be rectified later. 267
VI. CONCLUSION
The judiciary faces major challenges in the appointment process. Antiquated methods, which
are no longer in practice in modern judiciaries, are still enforced. A new system needs to be
formulated to work out the challenges and improve the development in judicial appointment.
As far as the various requirements are concerned, two steps pave the way towards improvement. One involves mandating postgraduate studies (like Germany), and the other involves
introducing specialized judicial education (like France). These should go hand in hand, not in
isolation of one another. The improved level of education requirements will increase the level
of competency and collaboration among candidates.
As for the appointment process, there must be transparency, justice, and equality for and before the public to ensure discrimination against women and the underprivileged is eliminated.
This research shows implicitly that there is a gap between de facto and de jure. There is discrimination against women and candidates from a lower socioeconomic status, preventing
them from joining the judiciary. In order to illuminate this gap, my recommendations can be
summarized in the following points. First, a new formulation of the SJC must be introduced
to reflect a democratic and accountable judiciary to members of the general public, who are
the source of judicial authority. The judiciary has to adopt clear methods of transparency.
The inability to adopt such rules will continue to generate the question about the ability of the
judiciary to face corruption, both internal and external. The SJC must include new members
in the appointment committee to reflect the democratic process of appointment and the legitimacy of its members. These new members can be senior professors, who enjoy great respect
within the judicial community. Second, the elimination of all discriminatory requirements in
the appointment process –– such as social class, political affiliation, and gender –– is called
for. It is no longer accepted that, while the law does not recognize any form of discrimination
among individuals, the judiciary still continues to exercise such discrimination. Finally, it
must raise the standard of appointment to include more educational and post-appointment
training programs, such as internships. In the interim, the additional education requirement
could include a postgraduate degree.
This research was as attempt to explain and detail the appointment process in Egypt. It tried
to overcome these challenges that hinder the efficiency of the Egyptian judiciary. The challenges that face a large number of law school graduates in securing judicial appointment.
Among the most important categories that are excluded from this process are: women, the
underprivileged, as well as those of political minority. It is largely illogical that an individual
is excluded based on being one of these previously mentioned categories. This research has
264

Id.
Jamie Boex, Democratization in Egypt: The Potential Role of Decentralization, URBAN INSTITUTE
CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT & GOVERNANCE, POLICY BRIEF, (Feb. 2011),
https://www.urban.org/sites
/default/files/publication/27151/412301-Democratization-in-Egypt-ThePotential-Role-of-Decentralization.PDF.
266
Id.
267
Id.
265

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2018

31

DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 3

32

AL DIN AL HAJJAJI: THE DILEMMA OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT IN EGYPT

offered a number of solutions, which can alleviate the severity of this exclusion. It followed
the comparative law method to improve judicial efficiency through all possible means.
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